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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
WALTER E. HELLER WESTERN
INCORPORATED, a California
corporation,
Appellant,

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

v.
U.S. ROCK WOOL COMPANY, INC.,
a Utah corporation; V. ROSS
EKINS; and, S. O. EKINS;

Case No. 860322

Respondents.
ooOoo
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The following issues are presented for review in this
case:
1.

Whether the district court, in interpreting

an unconditional guaranty agreement, erroneously concluded
that the guarantors under that agreement did not consent to
the lender's alleged impairment of collateral.
2.

Whether

the

district

court

committed

reversible error in failing to consider that the guarantors'
defense of impairment of collateral is unavailable where the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

guarantors are the controlling shareholders of the corporate
borrower whose loan obligations are being guaranteed.
3.

Whether the district court erred in failing

to consider that the guarantorsf as controlling shareholders
of the corporate borrower, had an affirmative duty to ensure
the

lender's

perfection

of

security

interests

in

the

collateral pledged as security for the debt.
4.
lender

Whether thp district court's finding that the

unjustifiably

impaired

collateral

pledged

by

the

borrower as security for the debt was clearly erroneous.
5.

Whether the district court's finding that the

lender breached its duty of good faith in seeking to enforce
the guaranty agreement was clearly erroneous.
6.
admitted

Whether

expert

the

testimony

district

court

based

neither

on

improperly
personal

knowledge nor assumed hypothetical facts.
7.

Whether the district court erred in awarding

the guarantors all attorneys' fees incurred in the case.
8.

Whether the district court erred in refusing

to grant a new trial for irregularities in its proceedings
consisting of improper ex parte communications between the
court and the guarantors' counsel concerning the merits of
the case.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by a secured lender to exercise its
rights under a continuing, unconditional guaranty executed
by the controlling

shareholders of a corporate borrower.

The guarantors are attempting to avoid liability under their
guaranty by claiming that the lender impaired the collateral
pledged by the corporate borrower as security for the debt,
despite their unambiguous waiver of that defense in their
guaranty.
DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT
In this action, appellant, Walter E. Heller Western
Incorporated

("Heller"),

sought

respondents, V. Ross

Ekins

(collectively,

"Ekins"),

the

judgment

("R. Ekins")
for

and

against

S. O.

$86,202.42

Ekins

under

a

December 27, 1979 guaranty agreement in favor of Heller (the
"Guaranty").

The Ekins1 obligations under the Guaranty were

secured by a deed of trust lien on their house.
four-day,
memorandum
"exempted"

non-jury
decision
from

trial, the district
that

liability

found
under

that

court
the

After a
entered

Ekins

the Guaranty

a

were

because of

Heller's impairment of collateral and its "bad faith" and
"premature" filing of a complaint
deed lien.

Beyond

to foreclose its trust

this, the district court awarded the

Ekins-attorneys1 fees in the amount of $63,718.38.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Heller

seeks

reversal

of

the

judgment

and

either

(i) entry of judgment in its favor as a matter of lawf or
(ii) a remand with directions to the district court to grant
Heller

a new trial free from the taint of the district

court's numerous substantive and procedural errors.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The Accounts Receivable Loan To Rock Wool.
Heller is a California corporation that engages in the

business

of

Defendant,

making

commercial

loans.

U. S. Rock Wool Company,

(R.

Inc.

3f

52).

("Rock Wool"),

before its liquidation in bankruptcy in 1984f was a Utah
corporation that manufactured and sold insulation.
Exhibit

"Y").

approximately

Since

99.67%

of

1978,
all

the

the

Ekins

issued

shares of Rock Wool's capital stock.

(R. 52;

have

and

owned

outstanding

(Tr. 1672).

Since

approximately 1952, the Ekins1 primary source of income was
the salary paid to them by Rock Wool.

(Tr. 1673).

In October 1979, R. Ekins, the president of Rock Wool,
began negotiating with Heller to obtain accounts receivable
financing for Rock Wool.

(Tr. 1559-60).

Due to Rock Wool's

uncertain financial condition, at that time, Rock Wool was
unable to obtain financing from conventional lending sources
such as banks or thrift companies.
several meetings

and a

(Tr. 1293, 1546).

review of Rock

Wool's

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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After

financial

condition.

Heller

agreed

financing,

(Tr. 1274-75).

to

provide

the

requested

Accordingly, Heller and Rock

Wool (through the Ekins) entered into an accounts receivable
loan arrangement (the "Loan") that was evidenced by a loan
agreement

dated December 27, 1979

(the "Loan Agreement")

whereby Heller agreed to loan to Rock Wool up to 65% of the
face value of any of Rock Wool's accounts
Heller

in

its sole discretion

borrowing."
Rock

" . . . which

considered] eligible for

(Exhibit "A"; App. i).
Wool

secured

its

obligations

under

the

Loan

Agreement by granting Heller a continuing general lien and
security

interest

in

(i) all

of

Rock

Wool's

accounts

receivable, instruments, chattel paper, general intangibles
and

contract

rights,

(ii) all

of Rock Wool's

inventory,

goods and related materials, and (iii) all of Rock Wool's
machinery, equipment and chattels.
were

evidenced

by

three

These security interests

separate

security

agreements.

(Exhibits "A", "B" and "D"). Heller did not perfect its
security

interest

in

Rock

Wool's

motor

vehicles.

(R.

1073).
As additional

security

for

the Loan, and to induce

Heller to make the Loan, the Ekins executed and delivered to
Heller the Guaranty.

(Exhibit "F"; App. ii).

Under the

Guaranty, the Ekins unconditionally guaranteed all debts,
obligations and liabilities then or later owing by Rock Wool
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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to Heller,

(Id.)

The Guaranty provided in pertinent part

that:
"[Heller] shall not be required to prosecute
collection, enforcement or other remedies
against the debtor [Rock Wool], or against
any person liable on any said . . . agreements, obligations, indebtedness or liability
so guaranteed, or to enforce or resort to any
security, liens, collateral or other rights
or remedies thereto appertaining, before
calling on [the Ekins] for payment; nor shall
[the Ekins'] liability in any way be released
or affected by reason of any failure or delay
on [Heller's] part so to doT
This guaranty is absolute, unconditional
and continuing . . . . "
(Id.)
(Emphasis
added).
Beginning

in January, 1980, Heller began making loan

advances to Rock Wool under the Loan Agreement.

Pursuant to

paragraph 3(f) of the Loan Agreement, Heller provided Rock
Wool with a monthly statement of Rock Wool's loan account.
(Tr. 1294).

Paragraph 3(f) specified that the loan account

" . . . will conclusively be deemed correct and accepted by
[Rock Wool],
statement

of

unless

[Rock

exceptions

Wool] gives Heller

within

thirty

(30)

receipt of such extract or statement."
3(f)).

Rock

Wool

never

statement of exceptions.
2.

provided

Heller

a written
days

(Exhibit
with

after
"A", 11

any

such

(Tr. 1294).

The Valley Loan.
In May, 1981, the Ekins began negotiating with Valley

Bank & Trust Company ("Valley Bank") to obtain a loan for
themselves.

(Tr. 1615-17).

As a condition to making that

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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loan, Valley Bank required that Heller subordinate its trust
deed lien on the Ekins1 house to a trust deed lien to be
granted

by

Accordingly,
subordination

the

Ekins

Valley

to

Bank

agreement

Valley
and

Bank.

Heller

dated

"Subordination Agreement") (Exhibit

(Tr.

entered

May 11,

1617).
into

1981

(the

"DD"; App. iii) which

provided in pertinent part that:
"In consideration of the credit extended to
borrower [the Ekins] by the Bank [Valley
Bank]f
the
undersigned
[Heller]
hereby
subordinates its security interest in the
described
security
[the
real
property
described in Heller's trust deed] to the
above security interests of the Bank.
The
Bank may extend, modify or renew the so
secured obligation without affecting this
subordination. The undersigned agrees not to
demand, receive, accept or otherwise realize
on the security or the security interest or
to take any direct or indirect action to
obtain or realize such security until such
time as Bank is paid in full.
The
undersigned agrees to pay and/or deliver to
Bank immediately upon receipt any of the
described security or proceeds thereof."
(Emphasis added). (Id.)
The Ekins did not sign the Subordination Agreement. (Id.)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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a

3.

Rock Wool's Financial Deterioration And Collapse.
During

1982f

Rock

Wool's

financial

condition

(Exhibits "M" and "0"). 1

deteriorating rapidly.

began

Heller's

October 1982 audit of Rock Wool's operations disclosed an
increasing net operating loss; a persistent negative working
capital position and a negative net worth.

(Exhibit "0").

By letter dated October 22, 1982, Heller advised Rock Wool
that it would continue
arrangement

for

no more

its accounts
than an

receivable financing

additional

sixty days.

(Id.)

By November 12, 1982f Rock Wool's loan availability,

based

on

$631.28.

its

then

eligible

(Tr. 1401-04, 1418).

accounts,

was

a

negative

In December 1982, Rock Wool

pleaded for an extension of time in which its outstanding
loan balance could be " . . . gradually paid off."
"P").

(Exhibit

By letter dated December 23, 1982, Heller agreed to

the requested extension, advising Rock Wool that:
"Under
because

the
we

circumstances
and
primarily
continue to hold an equity

That deterioration was discerned as early as 1980 when
Rock Wool's auditors noted in their annual report for
the periods ending December 31, 1978 and December 31,
1979 that:
11

Unless management
takes
appropriate
measures the capital structure will not
sustain
continued
losses
of
this
magnitude)." (Exhibit D-15).
There is no evidence that management took any such
measures to stop Rock Wool's financial bleeding.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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position in Ross Ekins' residence, I will
continue to finance U. S. Rock Wool under our
existing formulas for an additional period
not to exceed six months from 12-31-82. Your
current borrowings approximate $80,000 which
is based on a 65% advance against your
eligible accounts receivable.
Because we must continue to carry you for a
period not to exceed six months I want you to
reduce your overall borrowings from us by at
least $10,000 a month, but in no event
greater
than
65%
of
your
eligible
collateral.
Assuming your loan at 12-31-82 approximates
$80,000 I would then expect your loan not to
exceed $70,000 at Jan. '83 and, $60,000 at
Feb., and $50,000 at March end and so on
until you are totally paid out but in no
event later than June 30, 1983."
(Exhibit
M
Q").
Two weeks

later, on January 5, 1983, Rock Wool

advised

Heller of its probable inability to reduce the loan balance
by the required $10,000 per month.
point, Rock Wool's

(Exhibit "R").

loan availability, based on its then

eligible accounts, had grown to a negative $7,589.
In

mid-January,

discovered

a

At that

mistake

1983,
in

Heller's

the

accounts

internal

Id.
auditors

receivable

aging

schedules that had been submitted by Rock Wool and the Ekins
to Heller:

the schedule

account by thirty days.

understated

the age of

every

(Tr. 1286-88, 1311, 1312).

As a

result, accounts that had been designated by Rock Wool and
the Ekins as thirty days past due were actually sixty days
past due; accounts that had been designated by Rock Wool and
the Ekins as sixty days past due were actually ninety days
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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past due, and so on.

(^d.)

On January 25, 1983, Heller

advised Rock Wool of that problem and of its concern over
the

continuing

availability.

increase
(Exhibit

in

Rock

Wool's

negative

loan

"S"). On that date. Heller also

advised Rock Wool that Heller still wanted it to reduce its
loan balance at the rate of $10,000 per month.
Wool did not do so.

(.Id.) Rock

(Tr. 1289, 1796, 1797; Exhibit "R").

On February 7, 1983, Heller's account analyst, James E.
Hillman ("Hillman"), determined that Heller had received no
collections

from

Rock

Wool's

account

debtors

since

January 31, 1983, and had received only $9,031 from Rock
Wool's debtors during

the entire month of January 1983.

(Exhibit "S"; Tr. 1289).

It was obvious to Hillman that

Rock Wool was in no position to cure its numerous defaults
under

the

schedule,

Loan
and

Agreement
accordingly,

or

to

on

meet

Heller's

February 8,

1983,

payment
Heller

exercised its right under the Loan Agreement to notify Rock
Wool's

account

debtors

to

monies owing to Rock Wool.

remit

directly

to Heller

all

(Exhibit "T"; Tr. 1315-17; 1342-

45).
4.

Commencement Of This Action.
Six weeks later, Heller filed its complaint

action
accrued

to recover

the principal sum of $116,700.43 plus

interest, costs and attorneys' fees.

Ten months

in this

later, Heller

filed

an amended

(R. 2-14).
complaint

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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to

reduce the amount of Heller's claim (R. 303-39) because the
amount sought in its original complaint was inadvertantly
and unintentionally overstated.

(Tr. 1290-92).

On December 6, 1983, Rock Wool filed a petition for
relief under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code
in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Utah.

Heller sought and obtained from the Bankruptcy Court

an order granting it relief from the automatic stay imposed
by 11 U.S.C. § 362 for the purpose of enabling Heller to
liquidate Rock Wool's liability under the Loan Agreement.
On May 3, 1984, Heller filed its proof of claim with the
Bankruptcy Court to assert and preserve its secured claim
against Rock Wool in the amount of $71,780.48 plus accrued
and accruing post-petition interest, late charges, services
charges and attorneys' fees.
evidence

that

Rock

Wool

(Exhibit "Z").

objected

There is no

to Heller's

proof

of

claim.
On December 7, 1983, Heller's legal counsel tendered to
Valley Bank a check in the amount of $55,000 to pay off
Valley Bank "in full" as contemplated by the Subordination
Agreement.

(Exhibit

"II").

Valley Bank, at the Ekins'

insistence, refused to accept that tender.
On May 3, 1984, the district
summary

judgment

determining

that

in
the

favor

of

court

Heller

outstanding

(R. 1076).
granted
by

conclusively

principal
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partial

balance

established

by Heller's books and records of account as

owing by Rock Wool was $73f670.75 through March 1, 1984.
(R.

456f

trial

557-59).

the

The

court

expressly

reserved

for

issue of Rock Wool's liability to Heller under

the Loan Agreement for the period subsequent to March 1,
1984.
5.

(Id.)2

The District Court's Finding That The Ekins' Were
"Exempted" From Liability Under The Guaranty.
After a four-day, non-jury trial, the court issued a

memorandum decision holding that (i) Heller's termination of
the Loan Agreement

(at a time in which Rock Wool was in

default and had a negative loan availability)/ and Heller's
exercise of its undisputable right to notify Rock Wool's
account

debtors

to make payment directly

"intended" by Heller
accounts

receivable

to be an " . . .

to Heller, was

impairment

of the

inventory which of course eventually

destroyed U. S. Rock Wool as an operable going concern";
(ii) Heller took actions "counterproductive" to its recovery

Rock Wool's counsel approved as to form Heller's order
granting partial summary judgment. That order was then
submitted
to the district
court
for signature.
Howeverf the district court never signed it. At trial/
when asked whyf the district court answered that:
"This [an accounting exhibit offered by the
Ekins] is Mr. Tanner's [the Ekins1 counsel]
attempt to have me reconsider that [the
partial summary judgment order].
And of
course, in the course of a trial I suppose
that's proper." (Tr. 1761).
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of Rock Wool's accounts receivable and
their

responsibility

as

factors

to

M

. . . failed in

the

borrower";

andf

(iii) Heller acted in " . . . bad faith in going against the
personal residence of the Ekins, proceeding with foreclosure
in a sum which was not due and owing and in failing to first
deal with the problem of Valley Bank & Trust . . . . "

The

court then concluded that because of that conduct/ the Ekins
were "exempted" from the claim of [Heller]".
6.

(R. 748-50).

The Court's Refusal To Enter A Finding As To Whether
The Ekins Waived The Defense Of Impairment Of
Collateral.
Notably/ in the memorandum decision/ the court failed

even to address the issue of whether the Ekins had/ under
the

Guaranty/

collateral.

waived

(IdL)

the

defense

of

impairment

of

Even though all parties recognized that

the dispositive issue in the case was whether the Ekins had
waived

that

otherwise.

right

(Tr.

1835)/

the

district

court

felt

Its position was articulated in an incredible

colloquy with counsel for the Ekins during a hearing on
Heller's

post-trial

objections

to

the

Ekins'

proposed

findings of fact and conclusions of law:
The Court:

Give me the reason.
Why is it [the
proposed finding of fact that the Ekins
did not waive the defense of impairment
of collateral] placed in there? Because
she [Justice Durham in the case of
Continental Bank v. Utah Sec. Mortg.f
701
P.2d
1095
(Utah
1985)] said
something about a case that had a
contract on a guaranty?
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Mr. Tanner:
This is the reason, Your Honor. One of
[The Ekins'
necessary elements to a holding that the
legal counsel] impairment of a security by failing to
perfect
and
by
not
pursuing
the
receivables,
etc.,
one
of
those
essential
elements
to
affirming
a
decision that the conduct does in fact
release the guarantor, is a holding that
the guarantor has not consented to those
acts,
to
the
release
or
the
impairment.
Now,

—

The Court:

I didn't find that. That's not in this
case.
Why
are you
putting it in
this case? It's not in this case
You
must have tried another case.
You 're
thinking of another judge.

Mr. Tanner:

No, Your Honor. It's in the arguments
of this case, and it's a pivotal
issue.
Mr. Anderson has correctly
espoused it as the issue that — that is
central to the question of release, and
we argued it before and during —

The Court;

I don't think that's in th:i.s case. I
di.dn't listen to that, didn •t pay any
attention to it, and iit has ncithing to

Mr. Tanner:

The guaranty clause, to conclude from
that that it does not constitute a
consent or waiver of the right to be
free from impairment of security, is an
essential element of the cause.

The Court:

No, I don't think so. You will have to
appeal me on that, but I don't think
so.
What I thought Mr. Ekins said was the
truth, that he was told by the people
from — representing Heller that they
wouldn't do anything to impair the
contract and so they wouldn't go ahead
and file those things. They would keep
those things out of this deal or they
didn't, which every way you went on that
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14

situation. And he said when I was on my
mission with Book of Mormon in one hand
and Bible in the other I realized I was
home freef because they would have to go
after my trucks and things before they
sell my house.
And I believe that's
exactly the representation they made to
him.
And I believe that to be the
truth, and that's a finding of fact.
Mr. Tanner:

But there has to be a finding that there
was no consent on the Ekins' part,
otherwise under California law or —
and/or under Utah law they will go up
and
the
Court's
and
it
reverse
conclusions will be of no avail.

The Court:

I don't think so.
Let's try it. I
don't think that's in this case.
I
think you're putting a lot of things in
the case that are not there. Why do you
put that in?

Mr. Tanner:

The reason I've just explained.

The Court:

I know you explained it to mef but that
doesn't make any sense to me, because
what he did is exactly what he intended
to do.

Mr. Tanner:

But Your Honor, he signed a Guaranty

The Court:

Yeah.

Mr. Tanner:

—

The Court:

Sure.

Mr. Tanner:

All right.
Now, this Court has to
decide that Guaranty did not waive their
right to — did not have the security
impaired because it's the writing that
they signed.
If the Court does not
interpret it in that fashion, it cannot
sustain that portion of the Court's
decision
and
that
is —
I mean
unequivocal. So that —

as well as did

—
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—

I thinkfs its equivocal as the
dickens.
I don't think that's in this
case. I keep telling you that.

The Court:

(Tr. 1834-38).
Several weeks later on April 29, 1986f

the district

court conducted a second hearing on Heller's objections to
the Ekins' proposed
law.

findings of fact and conclusions of

At that hearing, it advised

the parties that its

comments at the March 28 hearing were made for the purpose
of supposedly having counsel
" . . . pare down some of the things which I
thought overly broadened the information I
had given you in the memorandum decision and
was not necessarily my final word on what I
thought ought to be in the findings of fact
and conclusions of law.
I stated a simple
proposition
for
the simple
reason for
negotiation purposes, for shortening up your
work and address the issues more directly.
And in that regard I have been successful.
The findings, as I now look at them,
accurately represent this court's mind at the
time the memorandum decision was prepared and
published to the litigants." (Tr. 1899).
Heller

timely

filed

district court's judgment.

its notice

of appeal

from

the

(R. 1209-10).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

Under Utah law, the trial court's interpretation

of a written agreement
question of law.

(such as the Guaranty) presents a

As such, this court owes no deference to

the district court's interpretation and can independently
interpret the Guaranty, give effect to its plain meaning and
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conclude as a matter of law that the Ekins consented to
Heller's alleged impairment of collateral.
2.

The Ekins, as guarantors under the Guaranty, are

precluded from complaining about Heller's alleged impairment
of collateral because the Guaranty does not require Heller
to enforce or resort to any collateral before compelling
payment from the Ekins.

Therefore, under the Guaranty, the

Ekins explicitly consented to Heller's alleged impairment of
collateral.

The district court's failure to so interpret

the Guaranty constitutes reversible error.
3.

The Ekins, as controlling

shareholders

of Rock

Wool, are precluded as a matter of law from claiming a
discharge under the Guaranty.

Numerous cases recognize that

where the guarantor controls the debtor, the guarantor is
precluded from claiming a discharge based on the creditor's
failure to perfect its lien in the collateral.
court's

inexplicable

failure

to recognize

The district

that principle

constitutes reversible error.
4.

As

controlling

shareholders

of

Rock

Wool, the

Ekins had an affirmative duty to ensure Heller's perfection
of a security

interest

in Rock Wool's vehicles.

Their

breach of that duty estops them from seeking even partial
discharge under the Guaranty.

There is simply no precedent

recognizing that a borrower can, when having knowledge of
his

lender's

failure

to

properly

perfect

its
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security

interest, purposely withhold that knowledge and later rely
on it as a defense to payment.
5.
of

good

There is no evidence that Heller breached any duty
faith

Guaranty.

to

the

Ekins

in seeking

the

None of the bases on which the district court

relied in support of that conclusion —
of

to enforce

misleading

errors

in

Rock

Heller's detection

Wool's

aging

schedules/

Heller's use of notices to Rock Wool's account debtors, and
Heller's filing of a complaint in supposed violation of the
Subordination

Agreement

—

constitute

breaches

of

the

obligation of good faith imposed on parties to a contract.
6.

The trial court improperly admitted the testimony

of an expert who had neither personal knowledge nor was
asked to assume intelligible hypothetical facts on which to
base his opinion of the value of a number of Rock Wool's
motor vehicles.

The court allowed the expert to base his

opinions of the vehicles' value on scanty hand-written notes
taken

by another

person

which

described

in general and

primitive terms the perceived condition of those vehicles.
The

clearly

defective

foundation

for

the ensuing

expert

opinion violates Rule 703 of the Utah Rules of Evidence and
the cases interpreting that rule.
7.

There is no credible evidence that Heller impaired

Rock Wool's inventory in an amount of $25f000 or any other
amount.

The value of that inventory/ as reflected in Rock
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Wool's own bankruptcy schedulesf
than the value given at trial.

was almost

$10,000 less

Thereforef even if Rock Wool

failed to derive even a single penny from the sale of that
inventory, Rock Wool's maximum loss would have been no more
than

$15f888.26

schedules) —
8.

(the

value

reflected

in

bankruptcy

not $25,000.

The district court erred in awarding the Ekins any

portion of their claimed attorneys' fees.
extent

the

this

court

reverses

the

Obviouslyf to the
district

court's

determination that the Ekins are "exempted" from liability
under

the

Guarantyf

the

Ekins

would

cease

to

be

the

"prevailing party" for purposes of taxing attorneys' fees as
costs.

Moreoverf

even

if this court

upholds all or a

portion of the judgment, it is nevertheless clear that the
district court erred by failing to allocate the attorneys'
fees in the manner required by California law.
9.

The

communications
counsel.

record

establishes

between

the

trial

numerous
judge

and

ex

parte

the

Ekins'

The presence of those unauthorized communications

constitutes an irregularity in the court's proceedings which
prevented Heller

from having a fair trial.

The court's

refusal to grant Heller a new trial constitutes an abuse of
discretion.

This court should direct a new trial at which

Heller can present its substantive claims without the taint
of bias or the appearance of bias.
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ARGUMENT I
The District Court's Interpretation
Of The Guaranty Agreement Presents
A Question Of Law On Which
This Court Owes No Deference To
The District Court
This court has repeatedly recognized that:
"The interpretation of contract language
presents us with a question of law, on which
we owe no deference to the trial court's
construction, but are free to make our own
independent interpretation."
Wade v. Utah
Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 700 P.2d 1093, 1095
(Utah, 1985).
Accord,

Bradshaw

v. . Burningham,

671

P.2d

196

(1983);

Deschler v. Fireman's Fund American Life Ins. Co., 663 P.2d
97, 98 (Utah, 1983); Jones v. Hinkle, 611 P.2d 733, 735
(Utah, 1980).
In this case, the district court determined that the
Guaranty was devoid of any language creating a waiver of the
Ekins'
1074).

right

to

claim

In reviewing

impairment
that

of

collateral.

determination,

this

court

(R.
is

entitled to examine the plain language of the Guaranty and
independently interpret it without deference to the district
court's conclusions.
ARGUMENT II
Under The Guaranty, The Ekins
Explicitly Waived The Defense Of
Impairment Of Collateral
The Guaranty provides that:
"[Heller] shall not be required to prosecute
collection, enforcement or other remedies
against the debtor [Rock Wool], or against
any person liable on any said . . . agreeDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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mentsf obligation indebtedness or liability
so guaranteed/ or to enforce or resort to any
security/ liensf collateral or other rights
or remedies thereto appertaining, before
calling on [the Ekms] for payment; nor shall
[the Ekins1] liability in any way be released
or affected by reason of any failure or delay
on [Heller's J part so to do."
(Emphasis
added).
The

identical Guaranty was

interpreted

in Walter E.

Heller & Company v. Coxy 343 F.Supp. 519 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
In that case, the court held that under the guaranty the
guarantor
any

lack

M

. . . is not released or discharged by virtue of
of

diligence

with

respect

to

or

release

impairment off collateral by a secured creditor."
526.

or

Ld. at

Similarly/ in the case of Walter E. Heller & Company/

Inc. v. Wilkersonf 627 P.2d 773 (Colo. App. 1981)f the court
endorsed the very proposition advanced by Heller

in this

case: "under the terms of the agreement [the very Guaranty
at issue in this case]/ the defendants [guarantors] could
not compel Heller

to go against

the security."

^d. at

775.
Nothing
result.

in

the California

Civil Code3 changes that

While Section 2819 of the Code provides that/ "[a]

surety is exonerated . . . if by any act of the creditor/
without the consent of the surety/ the original obligation

The Loan Agreement, the Guaranty and the underlying
security
agreements
provide
that
all
disputes
thereunder shall be governed by California law.
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of the principal is altered in any respectf or the remedies
or rights of the creditor against the principal in respect
thereto, in any way impaired or suspended/' it is clear that
in the Guaranty the Ekins knowingly gave their consent and
waived the defense of impairment of collateral.
The established common law rule in California is that:
"A
surety
is not
exonerated
from
liability by a change in a contract
between the principal and the creditor
which
is made with his consent."
Mitchell & Tire Co. v. Bentel, 184 Cal.
315, 323, 193 P. 770 (1920).
As the later California case of Bloom v. Bender, 313 P.2d
568 (Cal., 1957), observed, "the logical corollary to this
statute [§ 2819] is the exception above noted; i.e. where
the

surety

consents

to

an

alteration

of

the

original

obligation of the principal or the impairment or suspension
of any right of the creditor's rights or remedies against
the principal, the surety is not exonerated."

Id. at 572.

As the court further observed, if effective consent to the
change in the obligation of a principal will prevent the
otherwise resultant discharge of the surety, such consent
may be given in advance of the alteration of the principal's
obligation as well as at or after the time of such act.,

Id.

at 573.
The
California

California
Uniform

Civil

Code

Commercial

is
Code

consistent
(whose

with

the

provisions

relating to the release of guarantors who are "parties to
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the instrument" apply by analogy)•
California

Uniform

Commercial

Section 3-606 of the

Code

recognizes

guarantor may, and in the context of standard

that

a

commercial

dealings often doesf consent to impairment of collateral.
Official Comment 2 to § 3606 addresses the issue of consent:
"Consent may be given in advance, and is
commonly incorporated in the instrument;
or it may be given afterward.
It
requires no consideration, and operates
as a waiver of the consenting party's
right to claim his own discharge."
As noted above, the Ekins' waiver of their rights to
complain about the manner in which Heller conducted itself
with

respect

to

the

taking,

perfecting

or

disposing

collateral is compellingly comprehensive and far reaching.
In fact, their waiver is so unequivocal that Heller is not
even required to enforce or resort to any security before
looking to the Ekins for payment.
flatly

consented

contemplated

in advance

Therefore, the Ekins have

to impairment

by Official Comment

2.

in the manner

Numerous case have

validated guaranty agreements under which the guarantor has
consented in advance to such impairment.
The recent California case of American Security Bank v.
Clarno, 151 Cal. App. 3d 874, 199 Cal. Rptr. 127 (1984), is
factually indistinguishable from the case at bar.
the

sole

shareholders

corporation's

note

to

of

a

corporation

American

Security

There,

guaranteed

the

Bank.

The

shareholders1 guaranties were secured by deeds of trust on
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

23

their residences.
by

a

security

The corporation's note was also secured

interest

in

inventory and equipment.

the

corporation's

accounts,

In addition, the corporation's

wholly-owned subsidiary pledged its assets to the bank as
security for the loan.

However, the bank failed to perfect

its security interest in that security.
After deciding that the shareholders could not invoke
the impairment of collateral provisions of Section 3606 of
the Commercial Code, the court then considered whether Civil
Code Section 2819 offered the shareholders any relief from
their guarantor

liability.

As in the present case, the

shareholders had executed guarantees expressly allowing the
bank in part:
" (i) To enter into any agreement of
forebearance with respect to all or any part
of the Liabilities, or with respect to all or
any part of the collateral, and to change the
terms of any such agreements;
(ii) To forebear
from calling for
additional collateral to serve any of the
Liabilities or to secure any obligation
comprised in the collateral;
(iii) To consent to the substitution,
exchange or release of all or any part of the
collateral . . . . "
Id. at 880, 199 Cal.
Rptr. at 130-31.
The court held that the above language constituted a
waiver of the shareholders' rights under Section 2819.
court

was

unwilling

to

impose

upon

the bank
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The

a duty to

perfect the security interest absent an express agreement to
do so.

Finding no such agreement, the court stated that:
"No case requires a creditor to acquire every
bit of security possible prior to imposing
liability on a surety. Such a ruling would
throw commercial transactions and suretyship
law into utter chaos.
We emphatically
decline to rewrite these laws. :Ed. at 883,
197 Cal. Rptr. at 133.

This

court

has

reached

the

same

conclusion.

In

Continental Bank v. Utah Security Mortgager 701 P.2d 1095
(Utah

1985),

several

individuals

executed

a

guaranty

agreement which provided in pertinent part that:
"[Continental Bank] shall not be required to
proceed first against [Utah Mortgage] or any
other person, firm or corporation or against
any collateral security held by it before
resorting to the guarantor[s] for payment;
and the liability of the guarantor[s] shall
not be affected, released or exonerated by
release or surrender of any security held for
the payment of any of the debts hereinbefore
mentioned . . . "
Id. at 1097.
The court

held

that

that language

(which is practically

identical to the waiver provisions contained in the Guaranty
at issue in this case) constituted an express waiver of any
defense based on impairment of collateral.

Accordingly, the

court held that the bank's failure to perfect the security
interest
corporate

in

the

borrower

trust
did

deeds
not

and

release

stock
the

pledged

by

guarantors

the
from

liability under their guaranties.
Identical conclusions have been reached in an extensive
series of cases.

American Bank of Commerce v. Covolo, 17
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U.C.C.

Rptr.

1052f

1058

("Where a

guarantor

or

surety

expressly and unequivocably consents to a waiver or release
of its rights in the collateral/ he will not be heard to
complain
security

of

the failure of

interest

therein

the creditor
in

the

to perfect

first

the

instance.");

Executive Bank of Ft. Lauderdale v. Tighe, 32 U.C.C. Rptr.
894, 898-99 (N.Y. Ct. of App. 1981) (" . . . a guarantor may
consent

to impairment

U.C.C. Official

of collateral and, as is noted in

Comment

2, such

consent

'operates

as a

waiver of the consenting party's right to claim his own
discharge.'"); Etelson v. Suburban Trust Co., 9 U.C.C. Rptr.
1371, 1373 (Md. 1971) (" . . . the [guarantors] by agreeing
to

the

broad

language

of

the

endorsement

limited

the

protection to which they might have otherwise been entitled
under the U.C.C.

It would be illogical to rule that the

bank had a duty to file the financing statement and its
failure to do so released the endorsers, when under the
endorsement

it

could

have

released

the

collateral

with

impunity."); Nat'1 Acceptance Co. of America v. Demes, 24
U.C.C. Rptr. 197, 201 (N. Dis. 111. 1977) ("We cannot escape
the

conclusion

that,

however

justifiable

defendant's

expectations that the finance company should proceed with
care

to

perfect

its

security

interest

properly,

these

expectations were not protected by the guaranty agreement
they signed."); Commerce Bank of St. Louis v. Wright, 37
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U.C.C. Rptr. 502, 508 (Mo. 1982) ("Neither the defense of
release or agreement not to sue the corporation, nor the
defense of

impairment

of collateral

is available to the

guarantors since they consented, by the unambiguous terms of
the guaranty set out above, to pay the debt regardless of
any release of the corporation or use of the collateral.");
Wilson v. Baxley State Bank, 29 U.C.C. Rptr. 1550 (Ga. 1980)
("The

guaranty

authorized

agreement

to

provided
release

that

the

collateral,

'bank

is

substitute

collateral . . . without any notice to undersigned without
affecting the liability of undersigned hereunder.1

Such a

release operates as a waiver of the consenting party1s right
to claim his own discharge.").
It is clear in this case that the Ekins have similarly
waived

in

alleged

advance

their

impairment

of

right

to

collateral.

complain
It

of

Heller's

is difficult

to

imagine a waiver more explicitly or clearly given: a clear
recognition by the Ekins that Heller shall not be required "
to

enforce

or

resort

to

any

security,

liens,

collateral or other rights for remedies thereto appertaining
before calling on [the Ekins] for payment; nor shall [the
Ekins1] liability

in any way be released or affected by

reason of any failure or delay on [Heller's] part so to
do."

(App. ii, Emphasis added).
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By

examining

and

signing

the

Guaranty,

the

Ekins

voluntarily and knowingly waived their rights to complain of
Heller's

failure

to perfect

its security

portion of Rock Wool's collateral.
initial

refusal

to

misinterpretation

of

consider

in a

The district court's

that

the Guaranty

interest

issue

and

constitute

its

later

clear error

requiring reversal of its judgment.
ARGUMENT III
The Ekins, As Controlling Shareholders
Of Rock Wool, Are Precluded As A Matter
Of Law From Claiming A Discharge Under The Guaranty
The Ekins own 99.67% of all the issued and outstanding
capital stock of Rock Wool.

(Tr. 1672).

Under established

lawf their position as dominating controlling shareholders
of

Rock

Wool

precludes

discharge otherwise

them

available

from

asserting

to independent

rights

of

third party

guarantors not affiliated with the principal debtor.
Numerous

cases

have

held

that

" . . .

where

the

guarantor controls the debtor it will not be discharged,
absent an express agreement to the contrary, by the failure
of the creditor

to perfect

its lien in the collateral."

Leslie Fay, Inc. v. Rich, 478 F.Supp. 1109, 1116 (S.D.N.Y.
1979),

28

principal
guarantor.
had

UoC.C.

Rptr.

debtor

was

830,
a

836.

subsidiary

In
of

that

case, the

the

corporate

The guarantor alleged that the plaintiff lessor

impaired

the

guarantor's

rights

of

subrogation

by

failing to properly perfect its security interest in certain
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leasehold

fixture

improvements.

The

court

assumed

for

purposes of argument that where an independent third party
guarantees an obligation as an accommodation to the debtor,
" . . . it seems reasonable for that party to rely on the
expectation that a businessman/creditor will act responsibly
and

make

collateral

at

least

under

a
the

reasonable
U.C.C.f

guarantor's subrogation interest."

effort
thereby

to

secure

protecting

its
the

The court then observed

that:
"This case, thoughf presents a
situation entirely different from that
in which an independent third party
guarantees a debt.
Several courts,
including
a New York
court, have
recognized that where the guarantor
controls the debtor it will not be
discharged, absent an express agreement
to the contrary, by the failure of the
creditor to perfect its lien in the
collateral. [Citations omitted].
This rule is sound.
In such a
situation, the guarantor as a principal
party to the negotiations resulting in
the ultimate transaction is in a strong
position to include in the agreement
specific conditions upon which guaranty
is based. In this case the guaranty was
unconditional despite the fact that the
parties outlined,
in great detail,
conditions concerning the collateral . .
in this context, the unconditional
guaranty must be read at face value."
The court

in Rich cited with approval

the case of

Nation Wide v. Scullin, 256 F.Supp. 929, 932, 3 U.C.C. Rptr.
724 (Dist. Ct. N.J. 1966):
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"These defendants were not cast in
the familiar
role of
accommodation
endorsers, or sureties, a status which
would
entail
less
stringent
responsibilities in the eyes of the
law.
Rather they were businessmen —
the
principal
anchors,
both
as
individuals and their corporate alter
ego — who undertook to perform this
arrangement.
It is reasonable to
assume, nothing contra wise on the
record, that they were possessed of some
measure of business acumen, when they
undertook to guarantee their company's
contract performance.
The paramount obligation here is
the guaranty contract of defendants, the
consideration for which was the contract
of
the
corporation
. . . their
obligation is unconditional."
The

Rich

court

accordingly

concluded

that,

"defendants

should not be allowed to evade their personal obligations by
virtue

of

corporate

control . . . "
In

the

acts

that

were

fully

within

their

Id. at 837.
instant

case,

the

Ekins

executed

the

Loan

Agreement, the trust deed and the three separate security
agreements

in

their

respective

capacities

president and secretary of Rock Wool.

as

corporate

Between them they

held and continue to hold all but a negligible portion of
Rock Wool's capital

stock.

Heller's loan advances were

essential to the preservation of their interest in Rock Wool
—

a corporation

source of income.

on which

they

relied as their primary

Their de facto domination of Rock Wool

precludes them from asserting the status of an independent
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disinterested third party guarantor able to claim discharge
by resort to common law and U.C.C. suretyship defenses.
The district court's failure to so hold constitutes
reversible error.
ARGUMENT IV
The Ekins, As Controlling Shareholders Of Rock Wool,
Had An Affirmative Duty To Ensure Heller's
Perfection Of A Security Interest In Rock Wool's Vehicles
And Their Breach Of That Duty Estops Them From
Seeking Even Partial Discharge Under The Guaranty
The

extraordinary

identity

of

interest

between

Ekins and Rock Wool carries an additional consequence.

the
It

imposes on the Ekins an affirmative duty to protect and
preserve the security pledged by Rock Wool to Heller and
thereby preserve their

rights of subrogation.

As shown

below, any breach of that duty precludes them from obtaining
a discharge from the Guaranty.
The

principle

that

a

guarantor

who

possesses

a

substantial identity of interest with the corporate borrower
cannot assert suretyship defenses otherwise available to an
independent guarantor is so widely recognized that one court
has stated that it could find " . . . no reported case where
a person who has an interest in the transaction can avail
himself of this defense [discharge or release] where there
has been a failure to file a financing statement."
Trading

Mikanis

Corp. v. Lowenthal, 22 U.C.C. Rptr. 1000

1977).
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(N.Y.

The

courts

situations
interest

the
in

have

consistently

guarantors

protecting

not

the

only

security

held

that

have

a

but

in

such

substantial

also

have

an

opportunity at least equal to that of the creditor to insure
that the creditor's security interest in the collateral is
duly perfected.

Mikanis Trading Corp. v. Lowenthal, supra,

at 1001, ("defendant's argument [that he is discharged from
liability on his guaranty by reason of the lender's failure
to perfect a security interest in collateral pledged by the
borrower] overlooks the fact that he, as well as plaintiff,
had a substantial interest

in protecting

the security as

against third parties in light of his guaranty.

Defendant,

as well as plaintiff, could have seen to the filing under
the Code.");
1247,

Tampa Bay Bank v. Loveday, 17 U.C.C. Rptr.

(Tenn. 1975) ("In

the case at bar the defendant [as

chief executive officer of the corporate borrower] was not
only in an equal position, but we find that she was in a
more superior position to protect the collateral then was
the plaintiff bank.").

Accord, Rushton v. U M & M Credit

Corp.,

1078

5 U.C.C. Rptr.

(Ark. 1968);

Union

Bank

y^

Kruger, 1 Wash. App. 622, 463 P.2d 273 (1969).
The record establishes that between December, 1979 and
December 7, 1983

(the date on which Rock Wool filed its

petition in bankruptcy), Rock Wool, through the Ekins, sold
anywhere between five and fifteen motor vehicles having an
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

32

estimated fair market value of at least $31,700.
20, 1811-16).

(Tr. 1716-

Heller could locate no evidence suggesting

that Rock Wool remitted any portion of those sales proceeds
to

Heller.

Even

charitably

assuming

that

Heller

was

negligent in failing to perfect its security interest in the
motor vehicles, it is clear that the Ekins had the last
clear chance to avoid any loss by apprising Heller of its
need to perfect and thereby ensure its ability to receive
proceeds derived

from

either analysis —

the sale of

the vehicles.

Under

duty to mitigate or last clear chance

—

the Ekins are plainly estopped from claiming any impairment
of collateral.
The district court's consequent failure to grant Heller
a credit in the amount of $31,700 against any loss claimed
by the Ekins constitutes reversible error.

The

ARGUMENT V
The District Court's Finding That
Heller Breached Its Obligation Of
Good Faith In The Enforcement Of
The Guaranty Is Clearly Erroneous
district court found that Heller breached

its

obligation of good faith to the Ekins in its enforcement of
the

Guaranty.

That

supposed

breach

consisted

of

following incidents:
(i)

Heller's creation of an "insuperable

negative balance" in Rock Wool's loan availability
through its detection of a misleading

error in
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the

Rock Wool's account receivable aging schedules (R.
1075);
(ii)

Heller's use of direct notices sent to

the account debtors identified by Rock Wool itself
(Id.);
(iii)
advance

Heller's filing of a complaint without

notice

or

demand

which

sought

the

appointment of a receiver to take possession of
the Ekins1 home " . . . all at a time when Heller
was bound by contract not to take action against
the Ekins1 home."

(Id.)

Even charitably assuming
faith

the

record

the existence of a duty of good

discloses

no evidence establishing

the

existence of an actionable breach.
A.

Heller's Detection Of A Misleading Error In Rock Wool's
Accounts Receivable Aging Schedule.
The

Heller's

record

establishes

internal

that

auditors

in

discerned

mid-January,
an

error

1983f
in

the

accounts receivable aging schedule submitted by Rock Wool to
Heller for the purpose of reflecting the nature, extent and
age of Rock Wool's accounts receivables. (See, pp. 9-10f
supra).

On January 25, 1983f Heller advised Rock Wool of

that problem and of the consequent increase in its negative
loan availability.

(Exhibit

"X").

Notably, Rock Wool's

loan availability had, since November 12, 1982, fluctuated
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between a negative $631.28 and a negative $7,589.30.

(Tr.

1401-04, 1418).
Therefore, Heller's detection of the errors in Rock
Wool's aging schedule simply increased the Rock Wool's loan
availability
$52,000.

from

a

negative

to

a

negative

It did not, as the district court found, create an

"insuperable negative balance."
1075).

$7,589.30

(Finding of Fact No. 9; R.

That balance had been negative for the ten weeks

preceding Heller's adjustment.

(Tr. 1401-04, 1418).

Thus,

there is no factual support in the record for a finding that
Heller's contractually authorized adjustment of the amount
of Rock Wool's loan availability did anything other than
increase its negative balance.

Rock Wool had, by its own

inability to effect collection of its accounts, created its
own negative loan availability.
B.

Heller's Use Of Notices To Rock Wool's Debtors.
On February 7, 1983, Heller's account analyst noted

that Heller had received no collections from Rock Wool's
account debtor since January 31 and had received only $9,031
from

those debtors during

(Exhibit "S"; Tr. 1289).

the entire month of January.

Accordingly, on the following day,

Heller sent to each of the account debtors reflected in the
last monthly

report

sent

to it by Rock Wool, a notice

requesting each account debtor to remit directly to Heller
all monies owing to Rock Wool.

(Exhibit "T"; Tr. 1315-17,
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1342,

1345).

authorized
6).

The

use

of

such

notices

in the Loan Agreement.

Moreover,

§

9-502(1)

of

is

expressly

(See, Exhibit
the

California

"A" f 11
Uniform

Commercial Code provides that:
"When so agreed and in any event on default
the secured party is entitled to notify an
account
debtor
or
the obligor
on an
instrument to make payment to him whether or
not the assignor was theretofore making
collections on the collateral . . . . "
The district court clearly erred in determining that
Heller's use of notices to Rock Wool's debtors violated its
duty of good faith owed to the Ekins.
C.

Heller's Inadvertant Overstatement Of The Amount Sued
For And Its Filing Of A Complaint In The Face Of The
Subordination Agreement.
Heller's

original

complaint

sought

to

recover

principal sum of $116,700.43 plus after-accrued
costs and attorneys' fees.

(R. 2-14).

the

interest,

Heller later filed

an amended complaint to reduce the amount of Heller's claim
(R.

303-39)

complaint

because

was

the

amount

inadvertantly

sought

in

overstated.

its

original

(Tr.

1290-92).

Heller's never purposely overstated the sought amount.

(Tr.

1385, 1408).
In

filing

Subordination
Valley

Bank.

its

complaint,

Agreement
The

which

Heller
it

Subordination

had

was

aware

entered

Agreement

into

provided

pertinent part that:
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of

the
with
in

"In consideration of the credit extended to
borrower [the Ekins] by the Bank [Valley
Bank],
the
undersigned
[Heller] hereby
subordinates its security interest in the
described
security
[the
real
property
described in Heller's trust deed] to the
above security interests of the Bank.
The
Bank may extend, modify or renew the so
secured obligation without affecting this
subordination. The undersigned agrees not to
demand, receive, accept or otherwise realize
on the security or the security interest or
to take any direct or indirect action to
obtain or realize such security until such
time as Bank is paid in full.
The
undersigned agrees to pay and/or deliver to
Bank immediately upon receipt any of the
described security or proceeds thereof."
(Emphasis added).
(See, Exhibit M DD M ; App.
iii) .
Heller's accounts analyst, James E. Hillman, testified that
Heller filed its complaint in reliance on the last sentence
of the Subordination Agreement which contemplated that upon
sale of the property any proceeds in an amount up to and
including the loan balance owing by the Ekins to Valley Bank
would be remitted to Valley Bank and any surplus could be
retained by creditors of the Ekins (such as Heller).

(Tr.

1407-08, 1409).
There

is

simply

no

basis

for

concluding

that

the

Subordination Agreement precluded Heller, as a matter of
law, from filing a complaint to judicially foreclose its
trust

deed.

The

last

sentence

of

the

Subordination

Agreement expressly contemplates such an occurrence.
district

court's tortured

interpretation

to the contrary

should be reversed as a matter of law.
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The

At

ARGUMENT VI
The District Court Improperly Admitted
The Testimony Of An Expert Who Had Neither
Personal Knowledge Nor Intelligible
Assumed Hypothetical Facts On Which
To Base His Opinion
trial, the Ekins adduced the testimony

of

an

appraiser for the purpose of establishing the fair market
value of several motor vehicles in which Heller had not
perfected

a

However,

in

vehicles1
11

security

interest.

purporting

value,

the

to

(See,

render

appraiser

his

1482-1501).

opinion

acknowledged

. . . did not see the vehicles."

the appraiser

Tr.

(Tr. 1485).

of

the

that

he

Instead,

based his opinion on a description of the

vehicles prepared three years earlier by David Ekins.
1485-89).

(Tr.

Heller's counsel timely interposed an objection

to the testimony, (Tr. 1487-89) but the court allowed the
testimony.

The appraiser indicated that it was unusual for

him to render an opinion of value without having actually
inspected
appraisal.

the physical
(Tr. 1491).

condition

of

the

subject

of his

In addition, he acknowledged the

tenuousness of that procedure:
Question by
Mr. Anderson:

And having said that, is it fair to say
that
the perception of a lay person
[such as David Ekins] of the condition
of a vehicle may well be different than
the perception of a qualified appraiser
such as yourself?

Answer:

There is no question„ Everybody would
look at things differently.
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Question;

And they would use different words to
describe the condition, would they
not?

Answer:

Oh, yes.

Question:

[And] regardless
of
the subjective
allowance that you may have made for
that condition, itfs a fact, is it not,
that the condition — that the language
utilized by a lay person to describe a
condition may well be different than the
language utilized by an appraiser?

Answer:

That's true.

Question:

And you have no way of verifying whether
Mr. Ekins1 perception of the condition
comports with yours?

Answer:

No.

(Tr. 1499, 1500).
The

proffered

testimony

is

absolutely

inadmissible

under Rule 703 of the Utah Rules of Evidence which provides
that:
"The facts or data in the particular case
upon which an expert bases an opinion or
inference may be those perceived by or made
known to him at or before the hearing. If of
a type reasonably relied upon by experts in
the particular field in forming opinions or
inferences upon the subject, the facts or
data need not be admissible in evidence."
A vitally important precondition to the admittance of
expert evidence is the showing of a proper foundation.
importance

of

a proper

foundation

has been stressed

Edwards v. Didericksen, 597 P.2d 1329 (Utah 1979).
case, this court stated that:
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The
in

In that

"The admissibility
of
[expert] evidence
depends in large measure upon the foundation
laid.
The expertise of the witness, his
degree of familiarity with the necessary
factsf and logical nexus between his opinion
and the facts adduced must be established.
When such a foundation is laid, Rule 56
[which is the predecessor of the presently
enacted Rule 703] of the Utah Rules of
Evidence
makes
an
expert's
opinion
admissible, even though it embraces an
ultimate issue."
A fortiori, failure to lay a proper
witness1

foundation

for the

opinion requires exclusion of that opinion.

As

this court noted in Day v. Lorenzo Smith & Son, Inc., 17
Utah 2d 226, 408 P.2d 189 (1974):
"The witness must testify as to the facts
upon which he bases his opinion and the facts
should be related to the opinion. Otherwise,
the testimony would be of little assistance
to the court and jury, and there would be no
way
of
testing
the
validity
of
the
opinion."
(Emphasis added).
_Id. at 133132.
In this case, there is no way the appraiser had any
"degree of familiarity" with the necessary facts since he
readily acknowledged
Ekins

to

describe

that the language employed
the

vehicles

could

substantially different than his own.
no

credible

Similarly,
opinion

"facts"

there

and

on

can be

the adduced

which
no

his

"logical

well

by David
have

been

Therefore, there are
opinion

is

based.

nexus" between

the

facts since there is no way of

determining with any clarity or precision just exactly what
those facts are.

In simple terms, there is simply no way
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for

Heller

to

test

and

plumb-bob

the validity

of

the

appraiser's opinion since it is impossible to know whether
the standards used by David Ekins to describe the condition
of the vehicles comported even remotely with those used by
the appraiser in rendering his opinion.
The Ekins1 clear failure to lay a proper foundation for
that testimony required the district court to exclude it.
Its failure to do so constitutes reversible error.
ARGUMENT VII
There Is No Credible"Evidence
Supporting A Finding That Heller
Impaired Rock Wool's Inventory
In An Amount of $25,000 Or Any
Other Amount
David Ekins (son of the Ekins) testified that Rock Wool
was forced to sell its inventory at a loss of $25,000.00.
(Finding of Fact No. 6; R. 1074).

Mr. Ekins lied: on Rock

Wool's bankruptcy schedules, which he prepared and signed
under penalty of perjury, he represented that the total
market value of all of Rock Wool's "inventory and supplies"
was the sum of $15,888.26.
attachment

(See, Exhibit "Y", specifically

to Schedule B-2(k) and Exhibit

"SS", p. 3).

Therefore, even if he failed to derive even a single penny
from the sale of that inventory, Rock Wool's maximum loss
would have been $15,888.26 —

some $10,000.00 less than the

amount to which he testified.

Clearly, the inventory and

supplies fetched some amount of monies which represent a
portion of that figure.

Therefore, there is no way Rock
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Wool suffered

any loss

remotely approaching

the figure to

which he testified and which the district court adopted.
ARGUMENT VIII
The District Court Erred In Awarding
The E k m s Any Portion Of Their Sought
Attorneys' Fees
The district court awarded the Ekins attorneys' fees in
the amount

of

$63 f 718.38.

(R.

1096-99).

The

purported

basis for the recovery of such fees is Section 1717 of the
California Civil Code which provides in pertinent part that:
" (i) In any action on a contract, where the
contract
specifically
provides
thaiattorneys' fees and costs, which are incurred
to enforce the provisions of that contract7
shall be awarded either to one of the parties
or to the prevailing party, when the party
who is determined to be the prevailing party,
whether he or she is the party specified in
the contract are notf shall be entitled to
reasonable attorneys' fees in addition to
costs
and
necessary
disbursements."
(Emphasis added).
Thus, to determine the Ekins' eligibility for recovery
of

attorneys'

fees

under

that

determinations must be made:
Ekins

relying

attorneys'
provide

to support

fees, and

for

the

(ii) does
of

claim
that

support

for

threshold

the recovery of

contract

attorneys'

incurred to enforce that contract?
question, namely,

two

(i) on which contract are the

their

recovery

statute,

specifically

fees

which

are

The answer to the first

the identity of the contract

thought to

the claim for attorneys' fees is the Guaranty and

the Trust

Deed.

Those

contracts

are

the only
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operative

instruments executed by the Ekins in connection with the
transactions at issue in this case.4

Therefore, they are

the sole documents on which the Ekins can rely to recover
attorneys' fees in this case.
Having
Trust

Deed

attorneys1

established
which
feesf

that

determine
the next

it is the Guaranty and the
the Ekins1

right

issue is whether

to

recover

the Guaranty

specifically provides for the recovery of attorneys1 fees
which

are

incurred

to

required by the statute.

enforce

the

Guaranty

itself

as

The only provision in the Guaranty

relating to attorneys1 fees is as follows:
" . . . we [the Ekins] also hereby jointly
and severally agree on demand to reimburse
you [Heller] and your assigns for all
expenses, collection charges, court costs and
attorneys' fees incurred in endeavoring to
collect or enforce any of the foregoing
against the debtor and/or undersigned or any
other person or concern liable thereon."
(Emphasis added).
(See, Exhibit "F"; App.
ii).
That provision, then, allows Heller to recover attorneys'
fees incurred for the purpose of collecting or enforcing
obligations

owing

under

the

Loan

Agreement

underlying security agreements described
portion of that paragraph.

and

the

in the preceding

The Guaranty nowhere provides

The Loan Agreement
and the underlying
security
agreements were, of course, executed by Rock Wool. The
Ekins are not signatories to those agreements.
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for

the

recovery

enforcement

of

attorneys1

of

the

Guaranty

fees

incurred

itself.

in

the

Therefore,

the

statutory requirement that attorneys1 fees are recoverable
only if they are incurred to enforce the provisions of that
very

contract

has

not

been

met.

The district

court's

obvious failure to recognize that requirement resulted in an
erroneous

conclusion

that

the Ekins were entitled

to an

award of attorneys' fees.
Finally,

the

Ekins can

seek

to

recover

only

those

expenses which they can demonstrate are directly related to
their obligations under the Guaranty and the Trust Deed.
Recovery must be denied for any attorneys' fees expended in
connection with any other matter in the case —

such as

declaratory judgment on the Subordination Agreement; issues
related to Rock Wool's bankruptcy filing; matters respecting
the prosecution of the counterclaim for damages; etc.

In

shortf any matter not directly referrable to their liability
under the Guaranty or the Trust Deed is not taxable as a
cost against Heller.
be required

Accordingly, the district court should

to conduct

further hearing

to determine the

precise allocation to be accorded any requested attorneys'
fees.
ARGUMENT IX
The Trial Judge's Ex Parte Communications With The Ekins1
Counsel Constitutes An Irregularity In Proceedings Which
Prevented Heller From Having A Fair Trial
No principle could be better settled than the
proposition

that

a

judge

should

refrain

from
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ex

parte

communications with counsel concerning any matter related to
a pending proceeding.

Canon 3A(4) of the Utah Code of

Judicial Conduct could not be clearer:
"A judge should . . . neither initiate
nor consider ex parte or other communications
concerning
a
pending
or
impending
proceeding."
Similarly, Disciplinary Rule 7-110(b) of the Utah Code of
Professional Responsibilityf with narrow exceptions, forbids
such communications.
For obvious reasons (including the happily infrequent
occurrence of such contacts and the practical difficulty of
detecting
addressing

such

abuses)/

the

there

consequences

are
of

few

reported

improper

communications between the court and counsel.
do, however, decline
conduct.

to countenance or

ex

cases
parte

Those that

rationalize such

For example, in Williams v. Williams, 249 P. 920

(Okla. 1926), the record established that the trial judge
had permitted the parties to bring the case to his attention
in

conversations

outside

the

regular

proceedings.

In

reversing the trial judge's refusal to disqualify himself,
and

in

remanding

for

a

new

trial, the court

noted as

follows:
"Our jurisprudence guarantees a fair and
impartial trial to litigants in express
terms. As the ultimate powers of the courts
to enforce their judgment must be made to
rest upon the public confidence and the good
faith and integrity of the courts, it is
implied, and is the concern of the courts
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that a case not only be tried fairly in fact
and in lawf but in such an atmosphere that
neither party plausibly can point to grounds
as a support for the charge that the judgment
followed from prejudice or bias of the trial
judge.
*

*

*

A judge can protect himself from such
charges by forbidding anyone to discuss the
case with him.
The law provides means for
punishing those who may persist in imposing
upon the judge. We go no farther than to say
that
the trial
judge should
not have
permitted the parties to discuss the case, or
talk to him about the case, outside of a
regular
court
proceeding.
But
having
permitted
the
instance
to
occur,
the
application for disqualification ought to
have been sustained."
To the same effect are State v. Crismore, 213 P.2d 293
(Okla. 1949) (If the petitioner had been able to establish
that

the

judge discussed

the merits of certain criminal

matters with the District Attorney, disqualification would
be ordered); Rosenfield v. Vosper, 195 P.2d 530 (Cal. 1948)
(Absent an express agreement between all counsel to allow
one of

those counsel

to discuss

the merits of proposed

findings of fact and conclusions of law in chambers without
the other counsel, new trial would be granted upon showing
of prejudice.);
(Where

it

was

In re Hasler, 447 S.W.2d
established

that

the

65

judge

(Mo. 1969)
conducted

telephonic and written communications with the wife in a
divorce proceeding before him without the knowledge of the
husband, the judge was properly disbarred.)
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In this case, the record clearly establishes that the
trial judge and the Ekins1 counsel engaged in at least four
separate telephone conversations and apparently one meeting
concerning the merits of this case.

The time slips of the

Ekins1 counsel attached to the Affidavit of Attorneys' Fees
dated March 17, 1986 (R. 878-1019), clearly disclose that
the trial judge and the Ekins1 counsel conducted telephone
conversations

on

July 26,

1984,

on

August 1, 1984 and on December 2, 1985.

July 31,

1984, on

(See, App. iv).

In addition to those telephone conversation (at least
two of which extended for at least 12 minutes), there are
two other entries in the time slips strongly suggesting the
occurrence
Ekins1

of direct

counsel:

contact

On

between

the court and

June 11, 1984, the

Ekins1

the

counsel

personally delivered certain unspecified pleadings to "Judge
Dee."

(See, App. v) .

Ekins1

counsel

either

In addition, on July 5, 1984, the
traveled

to the court

to contact

"clerk or judge" or tried to contact "clerk or judge," again
indicating his brazen belief that he was entitled, as a
matter of course, to contact the court with respect to this
case in the absence of Heller's counsel.
The

trial

judge's

explanation

(See, App. vi).
of

why

supposed

scheduling matters required 12 minutes of discussion was
that he may have placed the Ekins' counsel on hold while he
looked

for

the

file.

(See, App. vii).

However, the
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affidavit of the Ekins' counsel which seeks to explain and
justify those ex parte conferences makes no mention of that
fact.

(R. 1154-62).
It is impossible to conceive of any conduct more at

variance with the principle of evenhanded,
fair meteing out of justice.

Heller —

corporation who made substantial

impartial and

as a California

loan advances which the

court determined need not be repaid —

has now been informed

that the Utah judge who made that decision has chatted at
length with the borrowers1

counsel concerning the case in

the absence of Heller's counsel.

Surelyf despite whatever

explanation or rationalization is advanced for that conductf
Heller can never be convinced that it had a full and fair
adjudication of its claims.
is entitled

to a

Like any other litigant. Heller

trial presided

over

by a judge whose

impartiality cannot be questioned.
Accordingly,

this court

court's order

denying

enable Heller

to litigate

should

reverse

the district

Heller's motion for new trial and
its claims with a trial judge

whose impartiality cannot be questioned.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court should reverse the
district court's judgment and either (i) enter judgment in
favor of Heller as a matter of law, or (ii) remand to the
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district court to retry this case in accordance with this
court's decision.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 19th day of September, 1986.
HANSEN & ANDERSON

By Is/JtfiJU v / ftnthAM^
/C^rry D. Jones
John T. Anderson
Attorneys for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the
September,
foregoing

1986, four
instrument

true

were

Jj_

day of

and correct

copies

of the

sent, postage

prepaid

in the

United States mail, to the following:
Earl D. Tanner, Sr., Esq.
TANNER, BOWEN & TANNER
Attorneys for Respondents
1020 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

#
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ACCOUNTS FINANCING SECURITY Avjflxxxyu:^ i

December 27, 1979
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einafter called "Borrower", for valuable consideration, receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, hereby grants to WALTER E. HELLER
iSTERN INCORPORATED, hereinafter called "Heller", a continuing general lien and security interest in all accounts receivable, instruments,
ttei paper, general intangibles and contract rights (hereinafter collectively called "Accounts"; the obligors thereon being sometimes referred to
'account debtor" or "account debtors"), now or hereafter owned or acquired by Borrower, however, the same shall arise or be acquired, and all proceeds
I collections thereof, ail guaranties and other security therefor, all right, title and interest of Borrower in the merchandise which gave rise thereto,
luding the right of stoppage in transit, all returned, rejected, rerouted or repossessed goods, the sale or lease of which shall have given rise to any
ount or any such instruments or chattel paper (all, including the Accounts, hereinafter collectively called the "Collateral"), in the proceeds thereof
I in all of Borrower's books and records relating to the Collateral. The lien and security interest of Heller (or, in those states in which the Uniform
nmerciai Code has not become effeaive, the lien of Heller arising by the assignment to Heller of accounts (receivable) is to secure the payment
1 performtnce of all liabilities and obligations of Borrower to Heller of every kind and description, direa, absolute or contingent, due or to become
», whether now existing or hereafter arising hereunder
or under any other agreement, document or instrument heretofore, now or hereafter executed
I delivered by Borrower to Heller mmmdf^mi^ w* 1 •W*******bmmmmri*mr***t*m*&*iU* or by operation of law, whether or not evidenced by
' written agreement, document or instrument, including obligations to perform aas and refrain from taking aaion as well as obligations to pay money,
luding, without limitation, those arising under:

wentory Loan Security Agreement of even date herewith*
lattel Mortgage Security Agreement of even date herewith.
1 hereinafter called "Obligations").
WARRANTIES
Borrower hereby represents and warrants to Heller, and covenants, as follows:
a. All boob, records and documents relating to the Accounts tie and will be genuine and in all respects what they purport to be; the amount
of the Account shown on the books and records of Borrower represented as owing or to be owing at maturity by each account debtor is and
will be the correct amount actually owing or to be owing by such account debtor at maturity; each debtor liable upon the Accounts has and
will hate capacity to contract; Borrower has no knowledge of any fact which would impair the validity or collectibility of any of the Accounts.
b. If Borrower is a corporation, it is duly organized and existing under the laws of the sute of its incorporation, u set out above and is duly
qualified and in good standing in every other state in which the nature of its business requires such qualification.
c. The execution, delivery and performance hereof are not in contravention of law or of any indenture, agreement or undertaking to which
Borrower is a party or by which it is bound and, if Borrower is a corporation, the same are within Borrower's corporate powers, have been
duly authorized and are not in contravention of its chaster, by-laws, or other incorporation papers.
d. At the time of assignment, each account receivable represents and will represent an undisputed, bona fide sale and delivery of sjoods or services
rendered, or both, (or in the case of a contract right, represents and will represent an undisputed, bona Bdt agreement) and is not and will
not be subject to any setoff, contra-daim, discount or condition of any nature, except as specified in writing on or before the delivery to Heller
of schedules of assignment of accounts receivable; Borrower is, or, at the time of the assignment, will be the lawful owner of each Account
and has unqualified right to assign and grant liens and security interests to Heller therein; Borrower will, with respect to each Account, deliver
to Heller such pMpta as Heller may require, including, without limitation, the original delivery or other receipts and duplicate invoices.
e. Borrower keeps and will continue to keep all of its books and records concerning accounts receivable and contract rights and all of its other
books and records at its chief place of business, unless written notice to the contrary is given by Borrower to Heller.
f. In addition to those shown in Paragraph 1. hereof. Borrower has places of business only at the following locations:

HMMX 2320 Wall, Oflden, Utah 84401

g. All information furnished by Borrower to Heller concerning Collateral and proceeds thereof, its financial condition or otherwise, is and will
be complete, accurate and correct in all material respects at the time the same is furnished,
h. Borrower has fully complied and will fully comply hereafter with the requirements of all applicable laws, federal, state and local, and all
reserves provided upon Borrower's books and records are now and will be maintained hereafter in sufficient amounts to fully reflect ail
liabilities which have accrued or may hereafter accrue.
i. The Collateral and all goods giving rise thereto are and, for so long as any of Borrower's Obligations remain unpaid, will remain free of
any liens, charges, security interests, encumbrances and adverse claims, except for the benefit of Heller,
j. All covenants, representations and warranties contained in this Agreement shall be true and correct at the time of the execution of this
Agreement and shall be deemed continuing.
LOANS
a. Heller agrees, during the continuance of this Agreement, to make loans and advances to Borrower, payable on demand, against those Accounts
which Heller in its sole discretion considers eligible for borrowing, as follows: up to 6 5
«L 0 f the (see value of each Account shall be
paid upon the acceptance thereof by Heller; the remainder, being not less than 3 5
«& 0 f said face value, shall be held by Heller as a
reserve to secure the collection and payment of such Account and to secure the payment and performance of all Obligations. It is Heller s intention, in the absence of any default
in the
Obligations,
refund
amounts
held as
such
reserve
to BYU.
Borrower to the extent that the Accounts,
Digitized
by the
Howard W. to
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Library,
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Clark
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been collected. The
aggregate
amount
OCR,
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errors.of Borrower's indebtedness and obligations to Heller
incurred pursuant to this Aaxeement from time to time, shall be referred to hereinafter as "Borrower's Receivables Loan Balance." If Bor-

a s i s a s o f 1 s t o f e a c n moivcn, w i u i a

i.

.
I.
.
.
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rower's Receivables Loan Balance shall at any time exceed —2-5
% of the aggregate face value of said accepted Accounts, Heller may, but
need not, require Borrower, upon demand, to pay such excess to Heller or may require Borrower to immediately deliver such additional security
to Heller as may be satisfactory to Heller.
To evidence such loans, Borrower shall, at Heller's request, execute and deliver to Heller promissory notes payable to Heller on demand,
which said notes shall be in the amount of any portion or portions of Borrower's Receivables Loan Balance as at the time of Hellers request,
up to the full extent thereof. Said notes shall provide for the payment to Heller of interest at the rate provided in Paragraph 3. (d) and
shall be upon forms acceptable to Heller. The execution and delivery of such notes shall not constitute payment, satisfaction or release of
any Obligation.
Checks received by Heller shall not constitute payment, but credit therefor, when earned, shall, solely for .the purpose of computing interest
earned by Heller, be given as of the third calendar day after receipt, to allow for clearance.
* P r i m d 4j
Until all Obligations of Borrower to Heller are fully paid. Borrower will pay, monthly, as interest,
A Q~<YpT,r»nr p ^ a n n u m
computed on the daily Borrower's Receivables Loan Balance, from the date accrued until the date paid.
Borrower agrees to pay interest in an amount not less than t •*• § ^ ^ ^ « U "
per (XWKhl (yea')* irrespective of the amount of the
daily Borrower's Receivables Loan Balance.
Heller shall give Borrower, each month, an extract or a statement of Borrower's account, prepared from Heller's records, which will condusiveiy be deemed correct and accepted by Borrower, unless Borrower gives Heller a written statement of exceptions within thirty (30) days
after receipt of such extract or statement

mJRNED GOODS; INSTRUMENTS
L Borrower will ohysically segregate all rejected, rerouted, repossessed or returned goods sold or delivered in respect of iny Account, will immediately notify Heller thereof, will receive such merchandise in trust for Heller and will hold the same for such disposition as Heller may
direct, or, at Heller's option, will promptly refund all advances, loans and extensions made on such Accounts, and will post written notice that
they are subject to Heller's lien and security interest.
). Borrower will deliver to Heller, endorsed to Heller, all instruments, chattel paper, guarantees or other documents immediately when received
by Borrower as evidence or in payment of, or as security for, any of the Accounts, and will immediately transfer to Heller all security received
for any of the Accounts.
SPORTS; INSPECTION OF RECORDS; FURTHER ASSURANCE
3orrower represents and agrees:
L Ar all times to allow Heller, by or through any of its officers, agents, employees, attorneys and accountants, to possess, remove to the premises
of Heller or any agent of Heller for so long as Heller may desire, to make full use thereof in aid of Heller's rights under this agreement,
and to examine, audit and make extracts and copies from Borrower's books and ail other records, and, for said purposes or to aid Heller in
the enforcement of any of its rights under this Agreement, to enter, to remain upon and, without cost to Heller, to use the premises of Borrower or wherever the same may be found as often and for as long as Heller may desire.
>. To furnish Heller an aged accounts receivable trial balance in such form and as often as Heller requires.
:. To furnish to Heller, promptly upon request. Borrower's monthly statements of account with its customers. Borrower agrees that Heller
may from time to time verify the validity, amount and any other matters relating to the Accounts by means of mail, telephone or otherwise,
in the name of Borrower, Heller or such other name as Heller may choose.
i. To do all things required by Heller in its sole judgment, in order more completely to vest in and assure to Heller its rights hereunder. The
Accounts shall be assigned to Heller by written or printed instruments (hereinafter called "Schedules") in form acceptable to Heller, executed in such quantities as Heller may require, but the lien and security interest of Heller hereunder shall not be limited in any way to or
by the inclusion of Accounts within such Schedules and to the extent the terms and provisions hereof shall conflict with said Schedules
this Agreement shall be controlling; in the event the Uniform Commercial Code applies to any of the Accounts, Borrower need not furnish
Schedules relating thereto unless Heller shall so request; but Borrower's failure to execute and deliver such Schedules shall not limit the
security interest granted to Heller hereinunder»
e. To furnish to Heller within sixty (60) days from the end of its fiscal year, financial statements (including balance sheet, profit and loss
figures and accountant's comments) for that year and, at Heller's request, will furnish to Heller financial statements for each month by the
fifteenth day of the following month. All such annual financial statements shall be prepared by certified public accountants acceptable to Heller.
f. Borrower will promptly notify Heller in writing of any change of its officers, directors and key employees, change of location of its principal
offices, change of location of any of its assets (except the shipment, temporary storage or use in its manufacturing processes of inventory in
the ordinary and normal course of Borrower's business), change of Borrower's name, death of any co-partner (if Borrower is a partnership),
any sale or purchase out of the regular course of Borrower's business and any other material change in the business or financial affairs of
Borrower.
fOTICB OF ASSIGNMENT; COLLECTION; EXPENSES
a. Borrower agrees that it will, "upon the request of Heller and in such form and at such" times as Heller shall request, give notice of the assignment of or the granting of a security interest in all or any of the Accounts to the account debtors and that Heller may itselfgive such notice
at any time ana from time to time in Heller's or Borrower's name, without noticeJo Borrower, requiring such account debtors to pay the
account directly to Heller.
b. Borrower irrevocably appoints Heller its true and lawful attorney, with power of substitution, in the name of Borrower or in the name of
Heller or otherwise, for the use and benefit of Heller, but at the cost and expense of Borrower, without notice to Borrower or any of its
representatives or successors, to repair, alter or supply goods, if any, necessary to fulfill in whole or in part the purchase order of any account
debtor from which any Collateral has arisen; to demand, collect, receipt for and give renewals, extensions, discharges and releases of any
Collateral; to institute and to prosecute legal and equitable proceedings to rerlize upon the Collateral; to settle, compromise, compound or
adjust claims in respect of any Collateral or any legal proceedings brought in respect thereof; and generally to sell in whole or in part for
cash, credit or property to others or to itself at any public or private sale, assign, make any agreement with respect to or otherwise deal with
any of the Collateral as fully and completely u though Heller were the absolute owner thereof for all purposes. Borrower shall have no
power to make any allowance or credit to any account debtor without Heller's written consent.
c. Borrower also hereby irrevocably appoints Heller its true and lawful attorney, with power of substitution, to take control in any manner of
any cash or non-cash items of payment or proceeds thereof; to endorse the name of Borrower upon any notes, acceptances, checks,
drafts, money orders, bills of lading, freight bills, chattel paper or other evidences of payment or Collateral that may come into Heller's possession; to sign Borrower's name on any invoices relating to any Accounts, on drafts against account debtors and notices to account debtors;
to sign Borrower's name on any Proof of Claim in Bankruptcy against account debtors; to sign Borrower's name on any Notice of Lien,
Claim of Mechanic's Lien or Assignment or Satisfaction of Mechanic's lien; and to do all other acts and things necessary, in Heller's sole
judgment, to carry out this Agreement At any time or times when Borrower it in default hereunder, Heller shall have the right to enter
upon Borrower's premises and to receive and open all mail directed to Borrower; Heller shall turn over to Borrower all of such mail not
relating to Collateral. In the event of default, Heller shall have the right, in the name of Borrower, to notify the Post Office authorities to
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Heller it its option, at any time by: i) siring notification of its assignment of, or lien ana^Purity interest in the Accounts to the account
debtors, and no notice thereof to Borrower shall be required, or ii) giving notice of such revocation to Borrower. All moneys, checks, notes,
drafts, other things of value and items of payment together with any and all relating vouchers, identifications, communications or other data
received from account debtors collected or received by Borrower (or by any receiver, trustee, or successor in interest of Borrower, or by any
person acting on behalf of Borrower) in reference to the Accounts shall belong to Heller and shall be immediately transmitted by Borrower
to Heller at its office (or, if directed by Heller, deposited in Hellers account in a bank designated by Heller) in the original form in which
the same are received and endorsed by Borrower. Borrower shall have no right and agrees not to commingle with its own funds or to use,
divert or withhold any of the proceeds of any collections. Borrower hereby divests itselt of all dominion over the Accounts and the proceeds
thereof and collections received thereon. Borrower shall make entries on its books and records in form satisfactory to Heller disclosing the
absolute and unconditional assignment of Accounts to Heller and shall keep a separate account on its record boob of all collections received
thereon. Borrower further agrees to advise Heller immediately of any claims or disputes arising with respect to any Account and of any occurrence that may in any way impair or affect any of the Accounts or tend to reduce the value thereof. Should any suit or proceeding be instituted
by or against Heller or Borrower upon any of the Collateral or for the collection or enforcement of any Account, Borrower shall, without
expense to Heller, make available such of its officers, employees, agents, books, records and files as Heller may deem necessary to make
proper proof in Court.
, Heller shall be entitled to recover from Borrower all damages sustained by Heller by reason of any misrepresentation, breach of warranty or
breach of convenant of Borrower herein, expressed or implied, whether caused by the acts or defaults of Borrower, account debtors or others;
and also all reasonable attorneys' fees, court costs, court reporter expenses, long distance telephone charges, telegram costs, collection expenses,
accountants' fees, supervisory fees, expenses of attorneys, agents, officers, auditors, collectors, clerks and investigators for travel, lodging and
food costs, traveling expenses, disbursements, and all other expenses which may be incurred by Heller in enforcing payment of any Account
or of Borrower's Obligations in attempting to enforce payment, in realizing upon any Collateral, whether against any debtor. Borrower,
Borrower's guarantors or others, in supervising the records and proper management and disposition of the collection of Accounts, in prosecuting or defending any proceeding arising from the efforts of Heller to recover any money or other thing of value or otherwise to enforce
or protect any of Heller's rights hereunder.
. Borrower agrees that, as to any insurance it now or hereafter may maintain covering risks of damage to or loss or destruction of its books
and records, each such policy of insurance shall contain a loss payable clause in a form satisfactory to Heller naming Heller as payee and
providing that all proceeds payable thereunder shall be payable in any event to Heller, unless written consent to the contrary is obtained
from Heller; such proceeds shall be applied to Borrower's Receivables Loan Balance. Each such insurer shall agree that it will give Heller
thirty (30) days written notice before any such policy shall be altered or cancelled and that no act or default of Borrower or any other person
shall affect the right of Heller to recover thereunder in case of such damage, loss or destruction. Certified copies of such policies shall be
delivered to Heller upon demand.
NANCING STATEMENTS AND NOTICES OF ASSIGNMENT
. At the request of Heller, Borrower will join with Heller in executing one or more Financing Statements and/or Notices Of Assignment of
Accounts Receivable pursuant to any applicable law, in form satisfactory to Heller.
>. Without the written consent of Heller, Borrower will not allow any Financing Statement or Notice Of Assignment of Accounts Receivable
covering any Collateral or proceeds thereof to be on file in any* public office.
HBNTS OF DEFAULT; ACCELERATION
Ul Obligations shall, notwithstanding any time or credit allowed by any instrument evidencing a liability, become immediately due and payable
ut notice or demand upon the occurrence of any of the following events of default:
t. Borrower shall fail to make any payment or to perform any Obligation promptly when due;
>. Any warranty, representation, or statement made or furnished to Heller by or in behalf of Borrower shall have been false in any material respect
when made or furnished;
:. Any event shall arise which results in the acceleration of the maturity of the indebtedness of Borrower to others under any indenture, agreement or undertaking;
d. There shall occur any loss, theft, damage, destruction, sale or encumbrance to or of any of the Collateral, or any levy, seamc or attachment
thereof or thereon shall be made;
e. Any of the following shall occur: dissolution, termination of existence, insolvency, business failure, appointment of a receiver for any part
of the property of, assignment for the benefit of creditors by, or the commencement of any proceeding under any bankruptcy or insolvency
law by or against Borrower or any guarantor or surety for Borrower, entry of a court order which enjoins, restrains or in any way prevents
Borrower from conducting all or any part of its business affairs in the ordinary course, failure to pay any federal, state or local tax or other
debt of Borrower unless the same is being contested in good faith, termination of guaranty by any guarantor of Borrower's indebtedness to
Heller, whether under this Agreement or otherwise; it being expressly agreed that upon the happening of any event described herein, Borrower and each of Borrower's guarantors and sureties hereunder having or acquiring knowledge thereof shall immediately give written notice
of said event or fact to Heller;
f. Heller shall determine, at any time or times hereafter, that it is insecure with respect to the performance by Borrower of all or any part of
the Obligations;
g. Borrower recognizes that, in the event it violates any of the warranties, covenants, terms and conditions of this agreement, no remedy at law
will provide adequate relief to Heller and Borrower hereby agrees that Heller shall be entitled to temporary and permanent injunctive relief
in case of any such breach without the necessity of proving actual damages.
RIGHTS AND REMEDIES
Upon the occurrence of any such event of default, and at any time thereafter, Heller shall have the rights and remedies of a secured party under

California

. Uniform Commercial Code and under any and all other laws in addition to the rights and remedies provided herein
i any other instrument or paper executed by Borrower. All rights, powers and remedies hereunder or in any other instrument provided are cumue and none is exclusive.
ONE GENERAL OBLIGATION; CROSS COLLATERAL
All loans and advances by Heller to Borrower under this Agreement and under all other agreements constitute one loan, and all indebtedness
obligations of Borrower to Heller under this and under all other agreements, present and future, (including, without limitation, the documents
d in Paragraph 1 hereof) consititute one general Obligation secured by collateral and security held and to be held by Heller hereunder and by
« of all other agreements between Borrower and Heller now and hereafter existing. It is distinctly understood and agreed that all of the rights
ieller contained in this Agreement shall likewise apply insofar as applicable to any modification of or supplement to this Agreement and to
other agreements, present and future, between Heller and Borrower.
APPLICATION OF PAYMENTS Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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TERMINATION
This Agreement, on acceptance by Heller, shall continue until
D e c e m b e r 27 , 1 9 8 1
and from year
•ar thereafter unless terminated as to future transactions by the giving of notice by registered mail by either party to the other, not less than
f (30) days prior to any anniversary hereof. Borrower, at such termination date, shall make payment in full of all Obligations, whether evidenced
istailment notes or otherwise, and whether or not all or any part of such Obligations are otherwise then due and payable by Borrower to Heller.
it may terminate upon immediate notice at any time in the event Borrower commits any act of default enumerated in Paragraph 8. hereof. No
inatioo of this Agreement shall in any way affect or impair any right of Heller arising prior thereto or by reason thereof, nor shall any such terdon relieve Borrower or any of the guarantors of any obligation to Heller under this Agreement or otherwise until ail of said obligations are
paid and performed, nor shall any such termination affect any right or remedy of Heller arising from any such obligation, and all agreements,
anties and representations of Borrower shall survive termination.
BENEFITS OF THIS AGREEMENT
This Security Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the beneht of the parties hereto and their respective heirs, successors, representatives
assigns.
GOVERNING LAW; SUBMISSION TO JURISDICTION
The validity, interpretation, enforcement and effect of this Security Agreement shall be governed by the laws of the State of
owcr hereby consents to the jurisdiction of all courts in said State and hereby appoints
le address is
orrower's agent for service of process in said State.

California
_
^

SEPARABILITY
In the event that any provision hereof be deemed to be invalid by reason of the operation of any law or by reason of the interpretation placed
son br any court, this Agreement shall be construed as not containing such provision and the invalidity of such provision shall not affect the
liry of any other provision hereof and any and all other provisions hereof which are otherwise lawful and valid shall remain in full force and effect.
NOTICES AND PAYMENTS
Any notice, payment or refund required hereunder or by reason of the application of any law shall be deemed to have been given by either
r hereto when the same shall have been deposited in the United States mail, postage prepaid, at least five (3) calendar days prior to the
n proposed thereby (except that notice of termination shall be given in the manner set forth in Paragraph 12. hereof), addressed:
a. If to Borrower, at the address of Borrower specified in Paragraph 1. hereof, or to the latest address of Borrower of which Heller shall have
received notice from Borrower;

k if to Heller, at

300 Montgomery Street

San Francisco, California

94104

ATTORNEYS' FEES
If, at any time or times hereafter. Heller employs counsel for advice or other representation with respect to any Collateral or this Agreement or
other agreement, document or instrument heretofore, now or hereafter executed by Borrower and delivered to Heller, or to commence, defend
ntervene, file a petition, complaint, answer, motion or other pleadings, or to take any other action in or with respect to any suit or proceeding
ting to this Agreement or any other agreement, instrument or document heretofore, now or hereafter executed by Borrower and delivered to Heller,
o protect, collect, lease, sell, take possession of, or liquidate any of such Collateral, or to attempt to enforce any security interest or lien in any
ateral, or to represent Heller in any litigation with respect to the affairs of Borrower or in any way relating to any of the Collateral, or to enforce
rights of Heller or Obligations of Borrower, liabilities of Account Debtors, or any other person, firm, or corporation which may be obligated to
ler by virtue of this Agreement or any other agreement, document or instrument heretofore, now or hereafter delivered to Heller by or for the
£t of Borrower; then, in any of such events, all of the reasonable attorneys' fees arising from such services, and any expenses, costs and charges
ting thereto, shall constitute additional Obligations of Borrower, secured by the Collateral, payable on demand.
WAIVERS
a. Borrower hereby waives any and all causes of action and claims which it may ever have against Heller as a result of any possession, collection or sale by Heller of any Collateral in the event of a default by Borrower, notwithstanding the effect of such possession, collection or
sale upon the business of Borrower, and Borrower waives all rights of redemption, if any, it may have.
b. The failure at any time or times hereafter to require strict performance by Borrower of any of the provisions, warranties, terms and conditions contained in this Agreement or any other agreement, document or instrument now or hereafter executed by Borrower and delivered to
Heller, shall not waive, affect or diminish any right of Heller hereafter to demand strict compliance and performance therewith and with
respect to an? other provisions, warranties, terms and conditions contained in such agreements, documents and instruments, and any waiver
of any default shall not waive or affect any other default, whether prior or subsequent thereto, and whether of the same or of a different type.
None of the warranties, conditions, provisions and terms contained in this Agreement or any other agreement, document or instrument now
or hereafter executed by Borrower and delivered to Heller shall be deemed to have been waived by any act or knowledge of Heller, its agents,
officers or employees, but only by an instrument in writing, signed by an officer of Heller and directed to Borrower specifying such waiver.
c Borrower waives any and all notice or demand which Borrower might be entitled to receive with respect to this Agreement by virtue of any
applicable statute or law, and waives demand, protest, notice of protest, notice of default or dishonor, notice of payments and nonpayments,
or of any default, release, compromise, settlement, extension, or renewal of all commercial paper, accounts, contract rights, instruments, chattel
paper, guaranties, and otherwise, at any time held by Heller on which Borrower may in any way be liable, notice of nonpayment at maturity
of any and all accounts, instruments or chattel paper, notice of any action taken by Heller unless expressely required by this Agreement and
«
hereby ratifies and confirms whatever Heller may do pursuant to this Acreement and agrees that Heller shall not be liable for any acts of
commission or *"iimiHi or for any errors of judgment or mistakes of tact or law.
EFFECTIVE DATE
This Agreement, which has been signed and delivered to Heller on the day and year first above written, shall not become effective until accepted
Heller under the signature of its duly authorized officers at its address set forth herein in Paragraph 16.
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GUARANTY
SALTER E. HELLER WESTERN, INCORPORATED

Date

D e c e m b e r 27

l9JL2_

lemen:

U. S. Rock Wool C o , , I n c .
To induce you to purchase or otherwise acquire from.
einafter called "Debtor") accounts receivable, conditional sale or lease agreements, chattel mortgages, drafts, notes, bills, acceptances, trust
pts, contracts or other obligations or choses-in-action (herein collectively called "receivables"), or to advance moneys or extend credit to the
or thereon, or to factor the sales or finance the accounts of the Debtor (either according to any present or future existing agreement or acn g to any changes in any such agreement or on any other terms and arrangements from time to time agreed upon with the Debtor, hereby
inting to and waiving notice of any and all such agreements, terms and arrangements and changes thereof) or to otherwise directly or in*
dy advance money to or give or extend faith and credit to the Debtor, or otherwise assist the Debtor in financing its business or sales,
lout obligating you to do any of the foregoing) we, the undersigned, for value received, do hereby jointly and severally unconditionally
intee to you and your assigns the prompt payment in full at maturity and all times thereafter (waiving notice of non-payment) of any and
idebtedneas, obligations and liabilities of every kind or nature (both principal and interest) now or at any time hereafter owing to you by
debtor, and of any and all receivables heretofore and hereafter acquired by you from said Debtor or in respect of which the Debtor has or
become in any way liable, and the prompt, full and faithful performance and discharge by the Debtor of each and every one of the terms,
itions, agreements, representation!, warranties, guaranties and provisions on the part of the Debtor contained in any such agreement or ar
ement or in any modification or addenda thereto or substitution thereof, or contained in any schedule or other instrument heretofore or
iftar given by or on behalf of said Debtor in connection with the sale or assignment of any such receivables to you, or contained in any other
iments, undertakings or obligations of the Debtor with or to you, of any kind or nature, and we also hereby jointly and severally agree on
ind to reimburse you and your assigns for ail expenses, collection charges, court costs and attorney's fees incurred in endeavoring to collect
iforce any of the foregoing against the Debtor and/or undersigned or any other person or concern liable thereon; for all of which, wu'
est at the highest lawful contract rate after due until paid, we hereby jointly and severally agree to be directly, unconditionally and primarily
i jointly and severally with the Debtor, and agree that the same may be recovered in the same or separate actions brought to recover the
ripal indebtedness.
Notice of acceptance of this guaranty, the giving or extension of credit to the Debtor, the purchase or acquisition of receivables, or the adement of money or credit thereon, and presentment, demand, notices of default, non-payment or partial payments and protest, notice of
tst and ail other notices or formalities to which the Debtor might otherwise be entitled, prosecution of collection or remedies against the Debtor
[ainst the makers, endorsers, or other person liable on any such receivables or against any security or collateral thereto appertaining, are here-

uired j g prosecujecojlection^ enforce>ut in any way impairing or affecting our liability for the full amount thereof; and you s^s^noL be,
: or other remedies against the Debtor or against any person liable on any said receivables, agreements, ol igations, indebtedness orTHolRties
laranteed, o{ to enforceorrewrtjux^anv^je^^
ciefp; nor she htfu?ti*bilityln any way be released or affected by reason of ~mny faUtwe^or^eTaTT^n^^ur ipart so to do.
This guaranty is absolute, unconditional and continuing and payment of the sums for which the undersigned become liable shall be made to
at your office from time to time on demand as the same become or are declared due, notwithstanding that you hold reserves, credits, collateral
rcurity against which you may be entitled to resort for payment, and one or more and successive or concurrent actions may be brought heregainst the undersigned jointly and severally, either in the same action in which the Debtor is sued or in separate actions, as often as deemed
table. We expressly waive and bar ourselves from any right to set-off, recoup or counter-claim any claim or drmand against said Debtor, or
tut any other person or concern liable on said receivables, and, as further security to you, any and all debts or liabilities now or hereafter
ig to us by the Debtor or by such other person or concern are hereby subordinated to your claims and are hereby assigned to you.
Bach guarantor shall continue liable hereunder until you actually receive written notice from him by registered mail terminating the same
> him; but the giving of such notice shall not terminate this guaranty as to any other guarantor, nor relieve the one giving such notice from
lity as to any debt, undertaking or liability incurred or undertaken prior to such time. The death of any of the guarantors shall not terminate
guaranty as to his estate or as to the surviving guarantors, but the same shall continue in full force and effect until notice of termination is
n and received as hereinbefore provided and all of said indebtedness, liabilities or obligations created or assumed are fully paid.
In case Bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings, or proceedings for reorganization, or for the appointment of a receiver, trustee or custodian
:he Debtor or over its property or any substantial portion thereof, be instituted by or against the Debtor, or if the Debtor becomes insolvent
lakes an assignment for the benefit of creditors, or attempts to effect a composition with creditors, or encumber or dispose of all or a subaal portion of its property, or if the Debtor defaults in the payment or repurchase of any of such receivables or indebtedness as the same
due, or fails promptly to make good any default in respect of any undertaking, then the liability of the undersigned hereunder shall at
' option and without notice become immediately fixed and be enforceable for the full amount thereof, whether then due or not, the same as
gh all said receivables, debts and liabilities has become past due.
This guaranty shall inure to the benefit of yourself, your successors and assigns. It shall be binding jointly and severally on the underid, their heirs, representatives and assigns, regardless of the number of persons signing as guarantors or the turn or order of their signing.
This instrument shall be governed as to validity, interpretation, effect and in all other respects by the laws and decisions of the State of
fornia.

-1K&*^
41 Park Terrace Dr.
I t Lake C i t v , Utah
lidence Address

^tm^u^^

^. JJ*3§.s Bkins

^jf^fctL
-C^Uc
S. 0 . Ekins
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In consideration of the financial acuomou.itu.-n^ given or 10 ue u'ven
or continued by Valley Bank and Trust Company [ b.:i.» " hereafter) to V . Ross and
Sonoma Q . Ekins
("Borrower" hereafter) Uu- undersigned agrees J S
follows:
Borrower
A.
B.
C.
D.
£.
Borrower

has the following obligations uwunj u. tie undersigned:
Title of obligation or instrument Deed of Trusj
Date Of Such obligation December 27tt., 19 79
Due date of obligation
Present balance owing
Security for obligation lot,14.08, Mt. Olympus Pork *4
has or is proposing to obtain o loan from bank dated

m

May 7
19 81 , in the amount of $ 67,000 uO and secured by the same
security or portions thereof as are presently pU*ti«jcd to undersigned and
described in Paragraph £.
In consideration of the credit extended to liorrower by the Bank, the
undersigned hereby subordinates its security hiun-.t \x\ the described security
to the above security interest of the Bank. The Bank may extend, modify or
renew the so secured obligation witnqut affecting this subordination. The
undersigned agrees not to demand, receive, aco-i-t or otherwise realize on the
security or the security interest or to take any direct or indirect action to
obtain or realize such security until such time as Bank vs^oaid in ful 1 r-^
The undersigned agrees to pay and/or deliver to ttank immediately upon receipt
any of the described security or proceeds thereof.
This Agreement shall inure to and be binder, upon the parties and
their successors, assigns and personal representatives.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has ex.-cuted t h i s Agreement as
of

A

" "' /flag

JJL

this

H^H
<T

day o f

Waljt.-i C_ Heller Western Incorporated

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTYOF>^/

y

On this

vw.:./

'- »

"

J.ii ..f

thousand nine hwml/id .HI.!
__, _ _ * . <.

_.
. i n ilicyearooe
J
before me
. _. n Nul.i/y Public. Suit- oJ California.

/

Jul) co/n/m-oioui il.m.l WMMI, JM r^jti.ill) «'i|i|jOuflcil

v4A:t\
OjnJ
^4 "

UNOA 0 URQAUl'K
NOTARY HubuC CALlfORMA
Cif W4 UuAlf 01 %kH f RAWC1SC0
My Commm.on (ipaei Dtc 14 1904

• gi ^ V M V ' V v

>i g y tpm 9 w m 9

w

TNtOOCtfnantitOntyA^tx^iAiiw.it «n.c^^«f M p i . i M»I3- „>u
«*flv«i<«>»aci«>"t«mj-•••««.*,.«.% v^.b«<«« •i«uh * «>•
*uMM«MtO«*«ft<»MC«QI«.«C<i>«T I t 4 l ) u ^ k r « .
• » » * ' • • < > < • « • Oi v r « * w J 4 k K

.

- • .-'?L-~

'

krumn to me to be \\w
mlm _ oi the corporation
described in ami ili.ii <
id .1 I'M- WIIIJIM HLsiniiiunt, JIKI .IUO known to
mo la be Clie* person
w Jin < \i( uied the within insi r ument on behalf
of the corporation [lii'iviii II.UIHJ .uid acknowledged (o nic that such
corporation ex ecu led the Mini
IN WITNESS IVJIKKKOFJ have hereunto set my haiui and ailued
my official *enI in the _ .
' . _ . / '._*. i2-' County of „ ,/^'ffiT ' x* "»
lhcda> and ve.«riiilhiatertificatulir>l above written
— — « — - » —

>|^«. «. 1 «»«v • • ' , • H . . ,

Notary Public. Stale of CuJifunim

• • w w J , < « h a . f u t * . , i.-u..»«» O i l ' m „ w . ^ l - . ( , . , i

* • » • « 0 » « * • • •••» »•*».•».„»«#• i A . i « *

Cowdery'b F oriu No 2b — Acknowledgement

My < oiiiiiii^tiiiii expiie.s..

Corporation^' C Sees 11901190 1)

he executed the above and foregoing Acceptance
NbTAfcf" PUULIC
My Commission
Expires:
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App. vii

1

Mr. Tanner also said I was ruining his summer vacation,

2

a lot of things like that, but I did do those things to

3 J try and move the case along.

In all the conversations I

4

had as far as I remember had to do with keeping this case

5

moving.

As you all acknowledge, this case grew like

6

Topsy.

What initially started out to be a collection

7

matter, because of the posture of the defendants, that

8

this was in some way aggregious conduct on the part of

9

the collector, and because of the California law, it grew

10

a lot.

11

I can't help that.

12

was mindful of that, and I was hoping someplace along

13

the line because of the sum that started out to be collected

14

that we could resolve the issue.

15

the decision on the law as I saw it and the facts and I

16

saw them applied to the law, and I in no way got any

17

input from Mr. Tanner and his office or Mr. Anderson and

18

his office that reflected on my determination of law and

19

fact.

20

It grew a lot more than the money involved, but
That's what you wanted to do.

And I

It didn't happen.

Motion for a new trial is denied.

I made

The stay is

21

denied except as agreed to between counsel without the

22

posting of the appropriate bond as required by the rules.

23
24
25

Thank you, gentlemen.
MR. ANDERSON:
the Court's comments.

Your Honor, I appreciate

Just one matter though.
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1

One thing that concerns me is that if the Court

2

is convinced that these conversations with Mr. Tanner took

3

20 or 30 seconds and was confined totally to scheduling

4

matters, I f m at a loss to know how the Court can allow

5

Mr. Tanner to recover for 12 minutes of time and why the

6

Court - -

7

THE COURT:

I can tell you - -

8 I

MR. ANDERSON:

- - the fact that 20

9 1 seconds1 conversation becomes 12 minutes of conversation
10

on every time sheet that doesn't taint - -

11

THE COURT:

That's an easy answer.

I

12

can give you a straight, easy answer.

Frequently when

13

I'm answering the telephone, because there are three lines,

14

I have to put people on hold.

15

and that's at my client's expense.

16

to pay for my time.

Mr. Tanner says I'm holding,
And somebody has got

That's the business I'm in.

17

I can certainly account for that.

18

I said hold the phone while I get the file, which may be in

19

Mrs. Renshaw's office, my court reporter, to see what

20

you're talking about, or hold the phone while I pull out

21

those documents that may be on my side bar for the

22

purpose of specifically finding out where they are, I

23

suppose if Mr. Tanner wants to charge his clients for that

24

time while he's waiting, he can, but I don't keep time

25

records.

I'm just responding to the question.
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If in fact

And this

J J.

was a complicated case.

And I suppose when a piece of

paper might have to do with the question being specifically
asked, it may take me some time to get.
This may come as a surprise to you.

This is

not my only case.
MR. ANDERSON:
THE COURT:

I appreciate that.

Ifve other things I'm looking

for, and if I can't find it right away I might put
Mr. Tanner on hold for 15 minutes while I'm looking for
what he wanted me to respond to.

Independently I can't

remember the length of that conversation, but I do have
occasions when I do have lawyers on hold for some time
to find out whether the documents they are talking about
have in fact been received in this office or whether they
are across the street in the County Clerk's Office, not
atypical as what I have here today.

I've got all your

courtesy copies, and I don't have the file.

And the reason

I don't have the file is because one of you has asked
Mrs. Renshaw, the court reporter, to transcribe the record,
and she's got the file.

So if you called and asked me

what's in the file, I would have to find out where it is
just today.

And that might take me a little while, to

find where Brad or Mrs. Renshaw has got it, and that would
account for a lapse of time.
Okay.

And I can explain that.

Thank you.
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